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from Depository Institutions (DIs). In addition, the Federal Reserve
maintains the quality level of currency in circulation by inspecting all
deposited notes. Notes that meet minimum quality requirements (ﬁt notes)
are bundled to be reentered into circulation while old and damaged notes are
destroyed (shredded) and replaced by newly printed notes.
Between July 2006 and July 2007, the Federal Reserve implemented a
Currency Recirculation Policy for $10 and $20 notes. Under the new policy,
Reserve Banks will generally charge DIs a fee on the value of deposits that
are subsequently withdrawn by DIs within the same week. In addition, under
certain conditions the policy allows DIs to treat currency in their own vaults
as reserves with the Fed. It is reasonable to expect that the policy change will
result in DIs depositing a smaller fraction of notes with the Fed. While the
policy is aimed at decreasing the costs to society of currency provision, it may
also lead to deterioration of the quality of notes in circulation since notes that
are deposited less often are inspected less often.
This article analyzes the interaction between deposit behavior of DIs and
theshreddecisionoftheFedindeterminingthequalitydistributionofcurrency.
For a given decrease in the rate of DIs’note deposits with the Fed, absent any
change in the Fed’s shred decision, what effect would there be on the quality
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distribution of currency in circulation? What kind of changes in the shred
criteria would restore the original quality distribution?
To answer these questions, we use the model developed by Lacker and
Wolman (1997).1 In the model, the evolution of the currency quality distribu-
tion over time is governed by (i) a quality transition matrix that describes the
probabilistic deterioration of notes from one period to the next, (ii) DIs’ de-
posit probabilities for notes at each quality level, (iii) the Fed’s shred decision
for notes at each quality level, (iv) the quality distribution of new notes, and
(v) the growth rate of currency.
Weestimatethreeversionsofthemodelforboth$5and$10notes.Wehave
not estimated the model for $20 notes because they were redesigned recently,
and the new notes were introduced in October 2003. The transition from
old to new notes makes our estimation procedure impractical; we discuss this
furtherintheConclusion.2 Althoughthepolicyaffects$10and$20notesonly,
we also estimate the model for $5 notes because the policy change initially
proposed in 2003 included $5 notes. (It is possible that at some point the
recirculation policy might be expanded to cover that denomination.) Also, it
is likely that the reduced deposits of $10 and $20 notes may induce DIs to
change the frequency of transporting notes to the Fed and, hence, affect the
deposit rate of other denominations. The model predicts roughly comparable
results for both denominations.
In each version of our model, we choose parameters so that the model
approximates the age and quality distributions of U.S. currency deposited at
the Fed. For each estimated model, we describe the deterioration of currency
quality following decreases in DI deposit rates of 20 and 40 percent, and we
provide examples of Fed policy changes that would counteract that deterio-
ration. As described in more detail below, we view a 40 percent decrease in
deposit rates as an upper bound on the change induced by the recirculation
policy.
According to the model(s), a 20 percent decrease in the DI deposit rate
would eventually result in an increase in the number of poor quality (unﬁt)
notes of between 0.8 and 2.5 percentage points. While this range corresponds
todifferentspeciﬁcationsofthemodel,nottoastatisticalconﬁdenceinterval,it
should be interpreted as indicating the range of uncertainty about our results.
For $10 notes, very small changes in shred policy succeed in preventing a
signiﬁcant increase in the fraction of unﬁt notes.3 Slightly larger changes in
1 The Appendix to Lacker (1993) contains a simpler model of currency quality that shares
some basic features with the model here.
2 New $10 notes were introduced in March 2006 and new $5 notes are expected to be
introduced in 2008; our data were collected in 2004 and early 2006.
3 We view “ﬁt notes” as referring to any notes that meet a ﬁxed quality standard determined
by the Federal Reserve. Prior to a decrease in deposit rates, a ﬁt note is synonymous with a note
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shred policy are required to keep the fraction of unﬁt $5 notes from increasing
inresponsetoa20percentlowerdepositrate. Naturally,a40percentdecrease
in deposit rates would cause a larger increase in the number of unﬁt notes,
although the greatest increase we ﬁnd is still less than 6 percentage points.
And even in that case there are straightforward changes in shred policy that
would be effective in restoring the level of currency quality.
1. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Federal Reserve Banks issue new and ﬁt used notes to DIs and destroy previ-
ously circulated notes of poor quality. In order to maintain the quality level
of currency in circulation, the Fed uses machines to inspect currency notes
deposited by DIs at Federal Reserve currency processing ofﬁces. These ma-
chines inspect each note to conﬁrm its denomination and authenticity, and
measure its quality level on many dimensions. The dimensions that are mea-
sured include soil level, tears, grafﬁti or marks, and length and width of the
currency notes. Fit notes are those that pass the threshold quality level on all
dimensions. Once sorted, the ﬁt notes are bundled and then recirculated when
DIs request currency from the Reserve Banks. To replace destroyed notes
and accommodate growth in currency demand, the Federal Reserve orders
new notes from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (B.E.P.) of the U.S.
Department of Treasury. The Fed purchases the notes from B.E.P. at the cost
of production.4 In 2006, the Federal Reserve ordered 8.5 billion new notes
fromtheB.E.P., atacostof$471.2million(BoardofGovernorsoftheFederal
Reserve System 2006a)—approximately 5.5 cents per note.
In 2006, the Federal Reserve took in deposits of 38 billion notes, paid out
39 billion notes, and destroyed 7 billion notes (Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco 2006). Of the 19.9 million pounds of notes destroyed every year,
approximately 48 percent are $1 notes, which have a life expectancy of about
21 months. The $5, $10, and $20 denominations last roughly 16, 18, and 24
months, respectively (Bureau of Engraving and Printing 2007). Each day of
2005, the Federal Reserve’s largest cash operation, in East Rutherford, New
Jersey, destroyedapproximately5.2millionnotes, worth$95million(Federal
Reserve Bank of NewYork 2006).
response to a decrease in deposit rates, then it will shred some notes that were ﬁt according to
this ﬁxed standard.
4 Thus, seigniorage for notes accrues initially to the Federal Reserve. In contrast, the Fed
purchases coins from the U.S. Mint (a part of the Department of Treasury) at face value, so that
seigniorage for coins accrues directly to the Treasury.364 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Costs and Beneﬁts of Currency Processing and
Currency Quality
The Federal Reserve’s operating costs for currency processing in 2006 were
$319million(FederalReserveBankofSanFrancisco2006). DIsbeneﬁtfrom
the Fed’s currency processing services in at least two ways. First, the Fed-
eral Reserve ships out only ﬁt currency, whereas DIs accumulate a mixture of
ﬁt and unﬁt currency; to the extent that DIs’ customers—and their ATMs—
demand ﬁt currency, DIs beneﬁt from the Fed’s sorting of currency. Second,
while DIs need to hold currency to meet their customers’ withdrawals, they
also incur costs by holding inventories of currency in their vaults. Currency
inventories take up valuable space and require expenditures on security sys-
tems; in addition, currency in the vault is “idle,” whereas currency deposited
with the Fed is eligible to be lent out in the federal funds market at a positive
nominal interest rate. Thus, the Fed’s currency processing services amount to
an inventory management service for DIs. The beneﬁts DIs accrue from cur-
rencyprocessingmaynotcoincideexactlywiththebeneﬁtstosociety. Onone
hand, positive nominal interest rates make the inventory-management beneﬁt
to DIs of currency processing exceed the social beneﬁt (Friedman 1969). On
the other hand, the social beneﬁts of improved currency quality may exceed
thequalitybeneﬁtsthataccruetoDIs: forexample,maintaininghighcurrency
quality may deter counterfeiting by making counterfeit notes easier to detect
(Klein, Gadbois, and Christie 2004). On net, it seems unlikely that the social
beneﬁt of currency processing greatly (if at all) exceeds the private beneﬁt.
This implies that it would be optimal for DIs to face some positive price for
currency processing. Lacker (1993) discusses in detail the policy question of
whether the Federal Reserve should subsidize DIs’use of currency.
Historically, the Federal Reserve did not charge DIs for processing cur-
rency deposits and withdrawals.5 Policy did prohibit a DI’s ofﬁce from cross-
shippingcurrency;cross-shippingisdeﬁnedasdepositingﬁtcurrencywiththe
Fed and withdrawing currency from the Fed within the same ﬁve-day period.
However, as explained in the Federal Reserve Board’s request for comments
that introduced the proposed recirculation policy (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2003a), the restriction on cross-shipping was not
practical to enforce. Thus, overall the Federal Reserve cash services policy
clearly subsidized DIs’use of currency.
Policy Revision
By 2003, the Federal Reserve had come to view existing policy as leading DIs
to overuse the Fed’s currency processing services (Board of Governors of the
5 Note, however, that DIs do pay for transporting currency between their own ofﬁces and
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FederalReserveSystem2003b). Factorscontributingtothissituationincluded
an increase in the number ofATM machines and a decrease in the magnitude
ofrequiredreserves. TheformerlikelyincreasedthevalueoftheFed’ssorting
services, and the latter meant that for a given ﬂow of currency deposits and
withdrawals by the DIs’customers, there would be greater demand by DIs to
transform vault cash into reserves with the Fed—which requires utilizing the
Fed’s processing services. In October 2003, the Federal Reserve proposed
and requested comments on changes to its cash services policy, aimed at
reducing DIs’ overuse of the Fed’s processing services (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 2003a). In March of 2006, a modiﬁed version
of the proposal was adopted as the Currency Recirculation Policy (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2006b).
The Recirculation Policy has two components, both of which cover only
$10 and $20 denominations. The ﬁrst component is a custodial inventory
program. This program enables qualiﬁed DIs to hold currency at the DI’s
secured facility while transferring it to the Reserve Bank’s ledger—thus mak-
ing the funds available for lending to other institutions but avoiding both the
transportation cost and the Fed’s processing cost. DIs must apply to be in the
custodial inventory program. One criterion for qualifying is that a DI must
demonstrate that it can recirculate a minimum of 200 bundles (of 1,000 notes
each) of $10 and $20 notes per week in the Reserve Bank zone. The policy’s
second component is a fee of approximately $5 per bundle of cross-shipped
currency. While this new policy is aimed at reducing the social costs in-
curredbecauseofcross-shippingcurrency, absentchangesinshredpolicyitis
likely to lower the quality of currency in circulation through reduced deposits
and thus reduced shredding of unﬁt currency.6 The primary concerns of our
study are the effect on currency quality of the anticipated decrease in deposit
rates, and the measures the Fed can take to offset that decrease in quality. To
address these issues we construct a model of currency quality. We assume
that shredding policy is aimed at restoring or maintaining the original quality
distribution. If the cost of maintaining quality at current levels exceeds the
social beneﬁts of doing so, it would be optimal to let the quality of currency
deteriorate somewhat.
2. THE MODEL
The model applies to one denomination of currency.7 Time is discrete, and
a time period should be thought of as a month. For the purposes of this
6 Federal Reserve Banks have estimated that over 10 years, the recirculation policy could
reduce their currency processing costs by a present value of $250 million. Taking into account
increased DI costs, the corresponding societal beneﬁt is estimated at $140 million (Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System 2006b).
7 By changing the parameters appropriately, it can be applied separately to more than one
denomination; indeed we will do just that.366 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
study, there are three major dimensions to currency quality: soil level front
(we will use the shorthand “soil level” or SLF), ink wear worst front (“ink
wear” or IWWF), and grafﬁti worst front (“grafﬁti” or GWF). There are also
at least 18 minor dimensions to currency: soil level back, grafﬁti total front,
etc. For a given denomination, we have separate models for each major di-
mension.8 Those models describe, for example, how the distribution over soil
level evolves over time. For each of those models, however, we use data on
the other dimensions to more accurately describe the probability that a note
of a particular major-dimension quality level will be shredded.9
The basic structure of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each
period, banks deposit currency with the Fed; their deposit decision may be
a function of quality in the major dimension (that is, banks may sort for
ﬁtness).The Fed processes deposited notes, shredding those deemed unﬁt and
recirculating the rest at the end of the period. The shred decision is based on
quality level in whatever major dimension the model is speciﬁed. However,
notes that are ﬁt according to their quality level in the major dimension are
nonetheless shredded with positive probability; this is to account for the fact
that they may be unﬁt along one of the other (major or minor) dimensions
in which the model is not speciﬁed. The stock of currency is assumed to
grow at a constant rate. Banks make withdrawals from the Fed at the end
of the period but these are not speciﬁed explicitly; instead, withdrawals can
be thought of as a residual that more than offsets deposits in order to make
the quantity of currency grow at the speciﬁed rate. In order to accommodate
growth in currency and replace shredded notes, the Fed must introduce newly
printed notes. Meanwhile, the notes that were not deposited with the Fed
deteriorate in quality stochastically. The quality of notes in circulation at the
end of a period, and thus at the beginning of the next period, is determined by
the quality of notes that have remained in circulation and the quality of notes
withdrawn from the Fed.
Formal Speciﬁcation of the Model
Time is indexed by a subscript t = 0,1,2,.... Soil level can take on values
0,1,2,...,ns − 1; ink wear can take on values 0,1,2,...,ni − 1; and grafﬁti
cantakeonvalues0,1,2,...,ng−1;ingeneral, largernumbersdenotepoorer
quality.10 We will use q to denote a particular (arbitrary) quality level.
8 The models for the three major dimensions are truly separate, in that they will yield different
predictions.
9As mentioned earlier, the model was ﬁrst developed in Lacker and Wolman (1997). That ar-
ticle studied a different policy question, namely expanding the dimensions of quality measurements
to include limpness.
10 The exception is soil level zero, which is assumed to describe currency that has been
laundered (i.e., has been through a washing machine) and is deemed unﬁt.Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 367
For the DIs’deposit decision, the vector ρ contains in its qth element the
probabilitythataDIwilldepositanoteconditionalonthatnotebeingofquality
level q. The vector ρ has length Q, where Q = ns or ni or ng, depending
on the particular model in question. For the Fed’s ﬁtness criteria, the Qx1
vector α contains in its qth element the probability that a deposited note of
quality q is put back into circulation. If the model were speciﬁed in terms of
every quality characteristic—so that Q were a huge number describing every
possible combination of “soil level front,” “soil level back,” etc.—then the
elementsofα wouldeachbezerooroneandtheywouldbeknownparameters,
taken from the machine settings. Because the model is speciﬁed in terms of
only one characteristic, the elements of α that would be one according to q
are adjusted downward to account for the fact that some quality-q notes are
unﬁt according to other dimensions of quality. The values of α must then be
estimated, and we describe in Section 4 how they are estimated.
The net growth rate of the quantity of currency is γ; that is, if the quantity
of currency is M in period t, then it is (1 + γ)M in period (t + 1). The
Qx1 vector g describes the distribution of new notes; its qth element is the
probability that a newly printed note is of quality q.11 The deterioration of
non-deposited notes is described by the QxQ matrix π; the row-r column-c
element of π is the probability that a non-deposited note will become quality
r next period, conditional on it being quality-c this period.12 Note that each
column of π sums to one, because any column q contains the probabilities of
all possible transitions from quality level q.
The model’s endogenous variables are the numbers of notes of different
quality levels, i.e., the quality distribution of currency. At the beginning of
period t, the Qx1 vector mt contains in its qth element the number of notes
in circulation of quality q. The total number of notes in circulation is Mt =  Q
q=1 mq,t, where mq,t denotes the qth element of the vector mt.
11 We allow for new notes to have some variation in quality. However, by choosing g ap-
propriately we can impose the highest quality level for all new notes.
12 We assume that the number of notes is sufﬁciently large that the probability that a quality
c note makes a transition to quality r is the same as the fraction of type c notes that make the
transition to type r. That is, the law of large numbers applies.368 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
































The symbol   denotes element-by-element multiplication of vectors or ma-
trices.13
Equation (1) is the model, although we will rewrite it in terms of fractions
of notes instead of numbers of notes. On the left-hand side, mt+1 contains the
number of notes at each quality level at the beginning of period t + 1. The
right-hand side describes how mt+1 is determined from the interaction of mt
(the number of notes at each quality level at the beginning of period t) with











This term accounts for the fractions (1 − ρ) of notes at each quality level that
are not deposited. These notes deteriorate according to the matrix π, and
thus the ﬁrst term is a Qx1 vector containing in its qth element the number of
circulatingnotesthatwerenotdepositedinperiodt andthatbeginperiodt+1
with quality q.If banks were to sort for ﬁtness, then the notes that remain in
circulation and deteriorate during the period would be relatively high quality
notes, otherwise they would be a random sample of notes. The matrix π has
Q2 elements; assigning numbers to those elements will be the key difﬁculty
we face in choosing parameters for the model.








This term accounts for the fractions α   ρ of notes at each quality level that
are deposited and not shredded—that is, α  ρ  mt comprises the deposited
notes at each quality level that are ﬁt and will be put back into circulation at
the end of period t. If banks were to sort for ﬁtness in a manner consistent
13 For example, if a = [1,2] and b = [3,4], then a   b = [3,8].Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 369
with the Fed’s ﬁtness deﬁnitions, and if banks possessed enough unﬁt notes to








, represents replacement of
shredded notes. The object in parentheses is the number of unﬁt notes that
are processed (and shredded) each period. Multiplying by the distribution of
new notes g gives the vector of new notes at each quality level that are added
to circulation at the end of period t to replace shredded notes.




, represents growth in the quantity of currency.
The number of new notes added to circulation to accommodate growth (as
opposed to shredding) is γM t, and the distribution of new notes is g, so this
term is a vector containing the numbers of new notes at each quality level
added to circulation at the end of period t to accommodate growth.
We noted above that withdrawals are not treated explicitly in the model.
The quantity of withdrawals can, however, be calculated. The number of
notes withdrawn in period t must be equal to the sum of deposits and currency







⎠ + γM t. (4)
NotethatthemodeldoesnotincorporatecurrencyinventoriesattheFed. New
notes materialize as needed, and ﬁt notes deposited at the Fed are recirculated
at the end of the period.
The evolution of currency quality over time is determined entirely by
equation(1). Givenavectormt describingthedistributionofcurrencyquality
at the beginning of any period t, equation (1) determines the vector mt+1
describingthedistributionofcurrencyqualityatthebeginningofperiodt +1.
The law of motion is determined by the parameters π, ρ, g, γ, and α.14
The Model in Terms of Fractions of Notes
Themodelhasbeenexpressedintermsofthenumbersofnotesateachquality
level. To express the model in terms of fractions of notes at each quality level,
weﬁrstdeﬁneft tobethevectoroffractions,thatistheQx1vectorofnumbers







14 We have written the model as if all parameters are constant over time. We maintain that
assumption for the quantitative results described in this report. The model remains valid if the
parameters change over time, although estimation becomes more challenging.370 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly







Note that the elements of ft sum to one, because Mt =
 Q
q=1 mq,t. Using
these deﬁnitions, we can rewrite the model (1) by dividing both sides by Mt
and recalling that Mt+1 = (1 + γ)Mt:
(1 + γ)ft+1 = π · ((1 − ρ)  ft)








With this formulation it will be straightforward to study the model’s steady
state with currency growth.
The Steady-State Distribution of Notes
Under certain conditions, the distribution of currency quality converges to
a steady state with the distribution ft, which is constant over time (see, for
example, Stokely, Lucas, with Prescott, chap.11). Assuming that a unique
steady-state distribution exists, we will denote it by f ∗. In the steady state,
the law of motion (7) becomes
(1 + γ)f ∗ = π · ((1 − ρ)  f ∗) + α   ρ   f ∗
+
  Q





Our method of choosing the model’s parameters will require us to compute
the steady-state distribution—we will assume that our data are generated in a
steady-statesituation. Onewaytocomputethesteadystateistosimplyiterate
on (7) from some arbitrary initial distribution f0 and hope that the iterations
converge. If they converge, we have found the steady state. Alternatively,
we can use matrix algebra to solve directly for the steady state from (8).
Ultimately, we want to rewrite (8) in the form
  · f ∗ = γg, (9)
where   is a QxQ matrix. If we can rewrite (8) in this way, then the steady-
state distribution is f ∗ =  −1·(γg).The ﬁrst step is to note that for any Qx1
vector v, we have v   f ∗ = diag(v) · f ∗, where diag(v) denotes the QxQ
matrix with the vector v on the diagonal and zeros, elsewhere. Using this fact,Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 371
we can rewrite (8) as
(1 + γ)f ∗ = π · diag(1 − ρ)· f ∗ + diag(α   ρ) · f ∗
+
  Q





Next, note that the scalar
  Q
q=1(1 − αq)ρqf ∗
q
 
can be rewritten as
((1 − α)   ρ)










((1 − α)   ρ)
  f ∗
Qx1
      
1x1
. (11)
Now we can express (8) in the same form as (9),   · f ∗ = γg,where
  ≡
 
(1 + γ)I − π · diag(1 − ρ)− diag(α   ρ) − g ((1 − α)   ρ)
  −1 .
(12)
Thus, the steady state can be computed directly as
f ∗ =  −1 · (γg).
The steady-state distribution f ∗ contains in its qth element the fraction of
notes with quality q,corresponding to a particular measurement of soil level,
grafﬁti or ink wear. Thus, f ∗ can be thought of as the marginal distribution
over soil level, grafﬁti or ink wear. When comparing the model to data, we
will use the marginal distributions for each major quality dimension and the
distribution of notes by age. We use the age distribution because the quality
distribution alone puts few restrictions on the matrix π: we can match a
given quality distribution with many π matrices, each implying a different
age distribution.
The Appendix contains a detailed description of how to calculate the
steady-state age distribution of notes. For now, we simply state the nota-
tion: hq,k denotes the fraction of notes that are quality q and age k, and hk
denotes the Q by 1 vector of age k notes, the qth element of which is hq,k.
3. THE DATA
The model’s predictions will depend on the numerical values we assign to the
matrixπ describingdeteriorationofnotes,thevectorρ ofdepositprobabilities,
the vector α of shred probabilities, the quality distribution of new notes g, and
thecurrencygrowthrateγ.Thissectiondescribesthebasicdatawhosefeatures
we attempt to match in choosing the model’s parameters.
The ideal data set for our purposes would be one with a time series of
observations on a large number of currency notes, with observations each
month on the quality of every note. Data of this sort would allow for nearly372 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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direct measurement of the matrix π. Of course such data does not exist,
and probably the only way it could exist would be if individual notes had
built-in sensors and transmitters. Without such data, we need to estimate the
parameters of π.We use two data sets for this purpose. One data set describes
themarginalqualitydistributionsonlyandhasextremelybroadcoverage. The
other data set is at the level of individual notes, and contains age of notes as
well as quality. It has more limited coverage.
Large Data Set Describing Marginal Distributions
ThelargedatasetcomprisesﬁtnessdatafortheentireFederalReserveSystem
for the months of January 2004 and May 2004, provided by the Currency
Technology Ofﬁce (CTO) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. This
data characterizes the marginal quality distributions for more than two-and-Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 373
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a-half billion notes. The data are at the level of ofﬁce location, date, shift,
supervisor, and denomination. For a particular denomination, we assume
that summing these data over all dates, supervisors, and shifts generates a
precise estimate of the steady-state marginal distribution over each quality
level. Figures 1 and 2 plot the marginal distributions over soil level, ink wear
andgrafﬁtiforthecombinedJanuaryandMay2004data, for$5and$10notes
(solid lines).15
The raw data have 26 quality levels for each category. However, for many
quality levels there are very few notes, and for speed of computation it is ad-
vantageous to decrease the number of quality levels. For each denomination
15 The same data set covers $20 notes, but as described in the Conclusion, our limited anal-
ysis of the 20s has not used this data.374 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and each category (e.g., SLF) we have, therefore, combined multiple quality
levelsintoone. Forexample,ournewsoillevelzeroforthe$10notesincludes
all notes with soil levels zero through 2 in the data. Table 1 contains com-
prehensive information about how we combine quality levels. Boxes around
multiple quality levels indicate that we have combined them, and the columns
labeled“q”containthequalitylevelnumberscorrespondingtooursmallerset
of quality levels. After combining in this way, we are left with between 7 and
13 quality levels for each denomination and category. For each denomination
and each dimension, there are three unﬁt quality levels. For example, for the
$5 notes SLF, quality levels 9, 10, and 11 are unﬁt.
Per-Note Data
In addition to the comprehensive data set describing marginal distributions,
we use per-note data sets covering approximately 45,000 notes each of $5
notes and $10 notes. These data were gathered at nine Federal Reserve ofﬁces
in February and March 2006. For each note, there is information on the date
of issue, as well as quality level in at least 21 categories, including SLF, GWF,
and IWWF. The dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2 are the marginal quality
distributions for SLF, IWWF, and GWF from the per-note data for the $5 and
$10 notes. There are minor differences relative to the marginal distributions
fromthelargedataset, butthebroadpatternsarethesame. Thisgivesussome
conﬁdence that the per-note data are representative samples.
Because the note data contain date of issue for each note, we are able to
get an estimate of the age distribution of notes. In Figure 3, the jagged dotted
line is a smoothed version of the age distribution of unﬁt notes from the note
data. The smoothing method involves taking a three-month moving average.
Without smoothing, the age distributions would be extremely choppy. Note
that in Figure 3, we plot the age distribution of unﬁt notes. It is the unﬁt notes
with which we are most concerned for this study, and whose age distribution
we care most about matching with the model. Unﬁt notes are those notes
whose quality is worse than the shred threshold in any dimension—major or
minor.
4. CHOOSING THE MODEL’S PARAMETERS
There are Q2 + 3Q + 1 parameters in each model; they comprise the Q2
elements of π,the 3Q elements of α,ρ,and g,and the single parameter γ. 16
Since Q is between 7 and 13, the number of parameters is between 71 and
209. We select the model’s parameters in several stages.17
16 Recall that Q is either ns,ni, or ng, depending on the version of the model.
17 Because our approach to selecting parameters is ad hoc, we hesitate to talk about “esti-
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Figure 3 Age Distribution of Unﬁt Notes

































































First, we make some a priori assumptions on the transition matrix π that
decrease the number of free parameters. Next, we pin down g, α, γ, and ρ
basedoninformationfromtheFederalReserveSystem’sCurrencyTechnology
Ofﬁce, the Federal Reserve Board, and preliminary analysis of the data. We
select the remaining parameters so that the model’s steady-state distribution
matches the quality and age distributions in Figures 1–3.
At this point, it may be useful to remind the reader where we are: we
have speciﬁed a model of the evolution of currency quality, and we will now
use data from the period before implementation of the currency recirculation
policy in order to choose parameters of the model. Once the parameters have
been chosen, we will simulate the model under particular assumptions about
how DI behavior will change in response to the recirculation policy. The
recirculation policy itself is “outside the model”; the model does not address
pricing of currency processing by the Fed, and the model does not address
(intraweek) cross-shipping because it is speciﬁed at a monthly frequency.Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 377
A Priori Restrictions on π
Wereducethenumberofparametersdeterminingπ byimposingtherestriction
that notes never improve in quality, except that soil level may “improve” to
zeroifanoteislaundered(i.e., thenotehasgonethroughawashingmachine).
This restriction means that almost half the elements of π are zeros. For the
ink wear and grafﬁti model, all elements above the main diagonal are zero.
For the soil level model, the elements above the main diagonal are zero except
in the ﬁrst row, which may contain nonzero elements in every column to
account for the possibility of laundered notes; in the ﬁrst column, the ﬁrst
row contains a one and all other rows contain zeros, because a laundered










2 for the three models. The last
restriction we impose on π is an inherent feature of the model: the columns
of π must sum to one, and π is a stochastic matrix with each element weakly
between zero and one. This adds Q restrictions, subtracting an equal number
of parameters.
Choosing α,g,ρ, and γ
The Federal Reserve chooses the deﬁnition of ﬁt notes, so there would be no
difﬁculty determining α if the model were speciﬁed in terms of all quality
dimensions simultaneously; αq would be one for ﬁt notes and zero for unﬁt
notes. However, since we specify the model in terms of only one dimension,
we need to adjust the shred parameter α to reﬂect the fact that notes may be
unﬁt even though they are ﬁt according to the dimension in which the model
is speciﬁed. For example, if the model is speciﬁed in terms of soil level, a
note that is very clean may nonetheless be unﬁt because of its level of ink
wear. We adjust for this possibility as follows, using the soil level example:
for each ﬁt degree of soil level q,calculate the fraction of notes with soil level
q that are unﬁt according to other dimensions and subtract that fraction from
αq. That calculation is necessarily based on the per-note data, as it requires
going beyond marginal distributions.The corrections we make to α are shown
in Table 2.
Thevectorgrepresentsthequalitydistributionofnewlyprintednotes. Our
estimates of g are from the Federal Reserve System’s Currency Technology
Ofﬁce(unpublisheddata),andthesearepresentedinTable3. Sortingbehavior
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Table 3 Quality Distribution of New Notes
$5 Notes $10 Notes
q SLF q IWWF q GWF q SLF q IWWF q GWF
00 01 0 0.935 00 01 01
1 0.010 10 1 0.065 1 0.965 10 10
2 0.695 20 20 2 0.035 20 20
3 0.295 30 30 30 30 30
40 40 40 40 40 40
50 50 50 50 50 50
60 60 60 60 60 60
70 70 70 70 70
80 80 80 80
90 90 90 90
10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0
11 0 11 0 11 0 11 0
12 0
We assume that DIs do not sort, which implies that all elements of ρ are
identical and are equal to the fraction of notes that DIs deposit each period.18
We set each element of ρ to 0.1165 for the $5 notes and 0.1322 for the $10
notes. These numbers are based on data from the Federal Reserve Board (S.
Ferrari, pers. comm.). Finally, γ is the growth rate of the stock of currency.
We have set the annual growth rate at 1.78 percent for the $5 notes, and 0.38
percentforthe$10notes, againbasedondatafromtheFederalReserveBoard
(S. Ferrari, pers. comm.).
Matching the Quality andAge Data
We select the remaining parameters of the matrix π—for each speciﬁcation
of the model—so that the model’s steady-state distribution matches as closely
as possible two features of the data. First, we want to match the marginal
quality distribution from the 2004 comprehensive data (Figures 1 and 2, solid
line). Second, we want to match the age distribution of unﬁt notes from the
2006 per-note data (Figure 3). Concretely, we select the parameters of π to
minimize a weighted average of (i) the sum of squared deviations between the
marginal quality distribution and that predicted by the model, and (ii) the sum
of squared deviations between the unﬁt age distributions and that predicted by
18A recent internal Federal Reserve study conﬁrmed that DIs have not been sorting to any
appreciable extent, as the quality distribution of currency that the Federal Reserve receives from
DIs is close to the quality distribution of currency in circulation (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2007). However, the recirculation policy—in particular, the fee for cross-shipping
ﬁt currency—gives DIs an incentive to sort. We address this issue in the Conclusion.380 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 4 π Matrix for $5 NotesAccording to GWF
q 01234567
0 0.9469 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 0.0531 0.9755 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.0000 0.0224 0.9647 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0353 0.9945 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.8828 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0054 0.1148 0.8294 0.0000 0.0000
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024 0.1706 0.9995 0.0000
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 1.0000
Notes: The row r, column c element of this matrix is the probability that a note will
become quality r next period, conditional on it being of quality c in this period. For
example, the probability that a note will be of quality 4 in the next period, given that it
is quality 1 in this period is 0.0022, the element in row 4, column 1.
the model.19 Table 4 contains one example of the π matrix; it is for the GWF
model of $5 notes.
With respect to the marginal quality distributions, we have no trouble
matching the data. In all of the model speciﬁcations, we match the marginal
quality distributions nearly perfectly. The age distributions are a different
matter, which perhaps is not surprising given their choppiness in the data—
the model wants to make the age distribution of unﬁt notes smooth. Figure 3
plots the age distributions implied by each speciﬁcation of the model, along
with the age distributions from the data.20 With the exception of the SLF
model for $5 notes, the age distributions implied by the model involve too
many unﬁt notes more than approximately four years old.
5. SIMULATINGA CHANGE IN DI BEHAVIOR
Because the response of the quality distribution to a decrease in deposit rates
depends on the transition matrix π, the fact that we have multiple models
means that we generate a range of responses to a decrease in deposit rates.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the time series for the fraction of unﬁt notes, in response
to 20 and 40 percent decreases in DIs’deposit rates, respectively. According
to ﬁnal Currency Recirculation Policy (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2006b), of the $10 and $20 notes processed by the Fed in
19 We have also experimented with adding to our estimation criterion the fraction of age k
notes that are unﬁt, for k = 1,2,... For moderate weights on this component the results are not
materially affected.
20 In Figure 3, the lines associated with the model stop at 56 months because we did not
attempt to match the age distribution beyond 56 months.Janicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 381
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Transition Path of All Unfit $5 Notes After DI Deposit Rate Falls 20 Percent









































































































2004, 40.4 percent were cross-shipped. Thus, a 40 percent decrease in de-
posits corresponds to DIs ceasing entirely to cross-ship. This seems unlikely,
so we view the 40 percent number as an upper bound on the effect of the recir-
culation policy. In addition, cross-shipping is likely more important for $20
notes than $10 notes, because of the necessity of having crisp (ﬁt) $20 notes
in ATM machines. Since the DIs always receive ﬁt notes from the Federal
ReserveSystem,alargervolumeof$20notesarecross-shippedthananyother
denomination.21 Thus, the 40.4 percent upper bound for $10 notes and $20
notes combined is higher than the upper bound for the $10 notes or $5 notes.
Each line in Figures 4 and 5 represents the transition path for the fraction
of unﬁt notes for a different major dimension model (soil level, ink wear,
grafﬁti). In response to a 20 percent decrease in the deposit rate, the models
predict a long-run increase in the fraction of unﬁt notes of between 0.017
and 0.025 for the $5 notes (i.e., around two percentage points), and between
0.008 and 0.018 for the $10 notes. In our large data sets, the total fractions
21 In 2005, the volume of $5, $10, and $20 notes that were cross-shipped were 12.7 percent,
9.0 percent, and 78.3 percent, respectively.382 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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of unﬁt notes are 0.173 for the $5 notes and 0.150 for the $10 notes. Note
that the model that provides the best ﬁt to the age distribution ($5 SLF) is
also the model that predicts the largest increase in the fraction of unﬁt notes,
0.025. Not surprisingly, a 40 percent decrease in deposit rates generates a
larger increase in the fraction of unﬁt notes—between 0.044 and 0.055 for the
$5 notes and between 0.019 and 0.044 for the $10 notes.
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 provide a different perspective on the effects of
a decrease in deposit rates. These ﬁgures plot on the same panel the initial
steady-statequalitydistribution(priortothedropindepositrates)andthenew
steady-state quality distribution corresponding to the lower deposit rate. For
the 20 percent experiment (Figures 6 and 7), the long-run effects on quality
are generally small, reinforcing the message of Figure 4. There are, however,
certain quality levels that are strongly affected. For example, the fraction of
$10 notes at soil level 6 (in Figure 7) eventually rises from 0.13 to 0.1832 in
response to the 20 percent drop in deposits. For the 40 percent experiment,
things look somewhat more dramatic: for example, the fraction of $10 notes
at soil level 6 increases from 0.13 to 0.27 (in Figure 9). To put this change in
perspective though, Table 2 tells us that only 6.2 percent of the level 6 SLFJanicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 383
Figure 6 Effect of 20 Percent Deposit Rate Decrease on Quality
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$10 notes are unﬁt, so the big increase in notes at that level (which is still ﬁt
according to SLF) brings with it an increase of less than one percentage point
in unﬁt notes. Recall that the change in total fraction of unﬁt notes is shown
in Figures 4 and 5.
If the Fed wished to offset the quality deterioration caused by a decrease
in deposit rates, a natural policy would be to shred notes of higher quality.
Table 5 displays scenarios for fraction of notes to shred at each quality level
in order to maintain the fraction of unﬁt notes at its old steady-state level.
For example, if deposit rates fall 20 percent, our SLF model for $5 notes
implies that shredding all notes in the worst-ﬁt category and shredding 35
percent of notes in the second worst-ﬁt category would counteract the deposit
decrease, leaving the fraction of notes unchanged. The columns in this table
should be read independently, as they each apply to distinct models. In other
words, the column labeled $5 SLF provides a policy change for SLF that is
predicted to bring about a stable fraction of unﬁt notes; no changes are made384 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 5 Policy Response to Offset Effect of Deposit Rate Decrease
20 Percent Decrease in Deposits: Fraction of Notes to Shred
$5 Notes $10 Notes








7 0.3512 7 0.0255 7070
81 81 8 0.545 80
91 91 919 0.6845
10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
12 1
40 Percent Decrease in Deposits: Fraction of Notes to Shred
$5 Notes $10 Notes




30 30 303 0.22
40 40 4041
5 0.198 50 5051
61 6 0.48 6061
71 71 7 0.125 71
81 81 8181
91 91 9191
10 1 10 1 10 1 10 1
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
12 1
to shred thresholds for other dimensions. Note that we have omitted GWF
from the analysis in Table 1; we were not successful in ﬁnding policies that
counteracted the quality decline by changing the shred policy for GWF. In
order to counteract the effects of a 40 percent decrease in deposits, Reserve
Banks would have to shred currency at signiﬁcantly higher quality levels,
depending on the particular model speciﬁcation. In the most extreme case,
whichistheIWWFmodelfor$10notes, theworstsixlevelsofﬁtnoteswould
have to be shredded (quality levels four through nine), and 22 percent of notes
at quality level 3 would have to be shredded to prevent overall quality from
deteriorating. Recall, however, that the 40 percent decrease in deposit ratesJanicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 385
Figure 7 Effect of 20 Percent Deposit Rate Decrease on Quality
Distributions of $10 Notes
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represents an upper bound on how we expect DIs to change their behavior in
response to the recirculation policy.
6. CONCLUSION
The quality of currency in circulation is an important policy objective for the
Federal Reserve. Changes in the behavior of depository institutions, whether
caused by Fed policy or by independent factors, can have implications for the
evolution of currency quality. Currently the Fed is implementing a recircu-
lation policy, which is expected to cause changes in the behavior of DIs and,
therefore, affect currency quality. The mechanical model of currency quality
in this article can be used to study the effects of changes in DI behavior and
changes in Fed policy on the quality distribution of currency. In general, the
model predicts relatively modest responses of currency quality to decreases in
DI deposit rates that are anticipated to occur as a consequence of the recircu-386 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Effect of 40 Percent Deposit Rate Decrease on Quality
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lation policy. For $5 and $10 notes, our model is able to match the marginal
quality distributions perfectly, and the age distributions of unﬁt notes reason-
ably well. Thus, we have some conﬁdence in the range of predictions that the
different model speciﬁcations make for the effects on currency quality of a
decrease in deposit rates. In what follows, we discuss potential extensions to
the current analysis.
Although our framework allows for sorting by DIs, the quantitative anal-
ysis has assumed no sorting occurs. If DIs do sort, then the researcher must
takeintoaccountthatthedistributionofcurrencyincirculationisnotthesame
asthedistributionofcurrencythatvisitstheFed. Thederivationsinthisreport
do not differentiate between the two distributions, but it is straightforward to
doso. IfDIsweretosortusingthesamecriteriaastheFederalReserve,thenit
is likely that the results presented here would overstate the decline in currency
quality following implementation of the recirculation policy; by depositing
with the Fed only low-quality notes, DIs would offset the deleterious effect ofJanicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 387
Figure 9 Effect of 40 Percent Deposit Rate Decrease on Quality
Distributions of $10 Notes
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depositing fewer notes. The recirculation policy clearly provides an incentive
for at least some DIs to sort because it imposes fees for cross-shipment of ﬁt
currency only.
Our analysis has not addressed $20 notes. Figure 10 illustrates the difﬁ-
culty they present: they are not in a steady state but are transiting from the old
to the new design. Of the old notes, more than 10 percent are unﬁt, whereas
of the new notes, less than 3 percent are unﬁt. All the old notes are more
than two years old, whereas all the new notes are less than three years old.
Our model is not inherently restricted to steady state situations. To apply it
to the 20s, one would want to use the form of the model in (7) and also allow
for γ (the growth rate of currency) to be time-varying or at least allow γ to
vary across designs. The non-steady-state form of the model (7) also could be
useful more generally, in providing a check on our estimates. If there is good
data on marginal quality distributions available monthly, then that data can be
used to generate forecast errors for the model on a real-time basis.388 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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One reason to question the steady-state assumption is the possibility that
the payments system is in the midst of a transition away from the use of
currency and toward electronic forms of payment. Although it is difﬁcult to
distinguish a change in the trend from a transitory shock, data on the stock
of currency does give some credence to this concern: from 2002 to 2007
the growth rate of currency has declined steadily, and at 2 percent for the 12
months ending in June 2007 it is currently growing more slowly than most
measures of nominal spending. A decreasing currency growth rate means that
there is a decreasing rate of new notes introduced into circulation. This would
likely require stronger measures by the Federal Reserve to maintain currency
quality in response to a decrease in deposit rates.
Theversionofthemodelestimatedhereisverysmallandeasytoestimate.
Expanding the model so that it describes the joint distribution of all three
quality dimensions studied here leads to an unmanageably large system. A
middle ground that might be worth pursuing would be to specify the model inJanicki, Moin, Waddle, and Wolman: Currency Quality 389
terms of two dimensions, say grafﬁti and soil level, and include information
about unﬁtness in other dimensions, as we have done here.
Finally, it would be useful to embed the currency quality model of this
article in an economic model of DIs and households. The DIs’ deposit rate
and sorting policy (both summarized by ρ) would then be endogenously de-
termined. Such a model could be used to predict the effects of a change in
the Federal Reserve’s pricing policy on DI behavior. It could also be used
to conduct welfare analysis of different pricing and shredding policies. The
model in Lacker (1993) is a natural starting point.
APPENDIX: DETAILS OF CALCULATING
AGE DISTRIBUTION
It is straightforward to compute the age distribution of notes for any quality
level and the quality distribution at any age. Begin by deﬁning the fraction of







For convenience, deﬁne hk to be the Q-vector containing in element q, the
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q is a Qx1 selection vector with a
1i nt h eqth element and zeros elsewhere.














and since the quality distribution of new notes is g,the fractions of notes that














⎠ · g. (16)390 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
For one-period old notes, the fractions are
h1 =
 







π · diag(1 − ρ) + diag(α   ρ)
1 + γ
 k+1
· h0, for k = 0,1,..., (18)
with h0 determined by (16). Thus, we can calculate the fraction of notes at
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